Abstract U.S. Government (USG) agencies provide foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) every year to disaster victims around the world. The ability to rapidly provide humanitarian aid serves Americas national interests, but USG interagency coordination for FHA remains ad hoc at the operational level. For its part, the U.S. military is not fully prepared for the unique operational challenges of FHA. Consequently, valuable time is often lost improvising a USG response after a crisis occurs. The operational-level framework for a USG response must be in place before a foreign disaster strikes. The principles and functions of FHA are distinctive at the operational level, and participating USG agencies have unique roles and responsibilities for organizing FHA operations. Unfortunately, the lack of interagency guidance has promoted an ad hoc approach to organizing FHA operations that has hampered past relief efforts. Several measures can be taken in order to better prepare for future FHA operations. These include pre-designating and training the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander and staff for FHA; developing interagency doctrine for organizing FHA operations; and over the long term, forming a standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) for FHA. 
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ORGANIZING FOR DISASTER: IMPROVING U.S. FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS
Great powers remain great if they promote their own interests by serving those of others.
Josef Joffe
The United States Government (USG) provides emergency relief every year to victims of manmade and natural disasters around the globe. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is part of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), serves as the focal point for most USG relief efforts. Normally, OFDA-together with the local U.S.
Ambassador and Country Team-can provide USG assistance with only limited involvement from other federal agencies. Sometimes, however, major disasters exceed OFDA response capabilities and require the participation of other interagency partners, including the Department of Defense (DOD). The U.S. military has played its part by providing life-saving disaster relief-called foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in joint military doctrine 1 -from Kurdistan to Afghanistan over the past decade.
The USG's ability to rapidly provide FHA serves America's national interests by mitigating the destabilizing effects that humanitarian crises can have on countries and regions. If left unaddressed, disaster-induced instability can provide fertile conditions for transnational threats such as drug trafficking and terrorism, and it can precipitate the failure of vulnerable states. Because of their often-rapid onset and severity, major humanitarian disasters require that U.S. response operations be swiftly planned and smoothly executed for maximum life-saving impact. Effective responses to humanitarian emergencies overseas can promote U.S. influence and prestige while helping to prevent crises from undermining national or regional stability. Conversely, haphazard FHA operations can hamper relief delivery while diminishing America's prestige and doing little to stabilize a crisis.
The USG typically joins a diverse cast of other governmental and non-governmental actors in an FHA operation, but it often plays a leading-sometimes decisive-role. Civilian and military personnel from the USG have gained much experience working together in the field, and more sophisticated FHA doctrine has produced better tactical-level coordination. Unfortunately, little attention has been focused at the operational level, where tactical-level activities are synchronized and integrated-and where USG coordination remains mostly ad hoc. Improvised coordination is compounded by inadequate military preparedness for the unique operational challenges of FHA.
Consequently, valuable time is often lost organizing the USG response after a crisis occurs.
Virtually every FHA operation has achieved some measure of success, but most could have been more effective. Regrettably, the cost of delay and inefficiency can often be measured in lost lives and human suffering.
The operational-level USG framework for FHA must be in place before a foreign disaster strikes. This paper describes the unique operational principles and functions of FHA and outlines the roles and responsibilities of participating USG agencies. It then illustrates how ad hoc organization of past FHA operations has hampered relief efforts. Finally, it offers several steps the USG can take to better prepare for FHA operations. These steps include pre-designating and training the Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), and Joint Task Force (JTF) staff for FHA;
developing interagency doctrine for organizing FHA operations; and over the long term, forming a standing Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) for FHA.
FHA at the Operational Level
Since the Cold War ended, the USG has intervened in several humanitarian crises requiring broad interagency support. These encompass responses to major natural disasters, including a devastating cyclone in Bangladesh, Hurricane Mitch in Central America, and severe flooding in
Mozambique. In Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo-and now in Afghanistan-the USG also responded to manmade disasters brought on by conflict and political strife. These disasters are known as complex emergencies. The experience gained in both natural and manmade disasters reveals some generalizable operational principles for FHA.
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Some Principles of FHA. In FHA missions, all USG participants must work toward a common strategic objective. Generally, this objective will be to first stabilize a humanitarian crisis and then lay the groundwork for long-term development and stability. The operational objectives of FHA missions are to relieve or reduce the effects of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions that might cause suffering. 3 Because of the time-criticality of humanitarian disasters, participants must seize the initiative by rapidly assessing the situation and providing relief coverage when and where it is needed. Both the strategic and operational objectives of FHA are political and economic in nature, and they should thus be defined by civilian rather than military leaders.
USG actions must be carefully synchronized and integrated in order to attain unity of effort toward these common objectives. Attaining unity of effort among USG agencies is challenging but essential because they must also synchronize their activities with a panoply of host nation agencies and foreign militaries plus International Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, and
Private Volunteer Organizations-referred to hereafter as Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs). Humanitarian objectives are best attained if the actions of each organization are mutually supporting, but each has its own interests and agenda-making unity of effort difficult to attain.
Nevertheless, each entity will normally share the basic objectives of saving lives and reducing suffering. USG agencies can best promote unity of effort among this cast of international actors by first attaining it themselves.
Unity of effort will promote overall economy in the amount of USG resources committed.
Effective coordination between USG agencies plus close cooperation with other relief actors will help prevent the duplication of capabilities and the expenditure of more resources than are required.
Economy is especially important in the use of military assets, which are often the most costly means available for delivering aid. Because FHA operations are supposed to be temporary, the goal of USG planners should be to help the host nation and HROs stabilize the crisis situation so they can transition to long-term recovery strategies. Finally, USG efforts must also strive for simplicity. The USG response should not overwhelm long-term development efforts with capabilities-such as sophisticated communications or advanced medical care-that cannot be easily replicated or sustained by the host nation or HROs once the USG presence has drawn down.
Operational Functions in FHA. Guided by these generalized principles, FHA operations entail several primary functions: assessment and planning; logistics; health and medical services; security; and command, control, and coordination. 4 Neither military doctrine nor other guidance note the major differences between these activities at the tactical and the operational levels.
However, individual FHA actions-such as building a temporary camp to house displaced persons-are distinct from the orchestration of all FHA activities throughout the entire area of relief operations. The synchronization and integration of all functions is the primary operational-level responsibility of FHA. During small-scale operations, the differences between the levels of FHA may blur, but the distinction between them assumes greater importance for larger, more complex crises.
Assessment & Planning.
Assessment is the first step in FHA and entails developing a common understanding of the crisis situation to guide relief planning. A timely and accurate assessment typically requires on-site teams of disaster response experts plus the use of surveillance capabilities to determine the magnitude of the crisis, types and amounts of relief required, time constraints involved, and other factors impacting the operation. An assessment should recognize gaps in relief coverage the USG might fill and identify potential security threats to the operation. The initial assessment forms the basis for developing an overall plan for an FHA operation. 5 Once an operation begins, the situation must be continually monitored to measure operational effectiveness and to determine when the USG may safely transition its activities to the host nation or HROs.
Logistics. The late disaster relief authority Fred Cuny observed that "Logistics is the lifeline of a relief operation." 6 Disaster aid must be transported to the affected area and distributed to those in need. Relief supplies may require temporary storage facilities and distribution centers to be established, and shelter must be provided for displaced persons. In the wake of a major disaster, infrastructure repairs are often needed to reestablish severed transportation links. Operational planners must develop a system to provide these individual functions across the entire area of relief operations.
Health & Medical Services. Because epidemiological threats and emergency medical needs are usually a major concern in FHA operations, the provision of health and medical care is also vital. At the operational level, a system must be developed to organize and administer these services throughout the entire area.
Security. In complex emergencies, relief workers and supplies must receive adequate protection before distribution and relief efforts can safely proceed. The security function is one that the military is uniquely equipped to provide, and a plan must be devised to provide security coverage wherever threats to the operation might exist. The CMOC focus is on day-to-day operations and synchronizing local civilian and military activities.
Command
Decisions on how to organize the relief operation, set priorities, apportion responsibilities, and establish field coordination are made at the operational level-commonly in a United Nations-run Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) or equivalent, where key decision makers coordinate overall relief strategy.
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Other Functions. In a humanitarian crisis, communications infrastructure may be damaged or non-existent, and FHA operations may require that they be reestablished. Another function often required after a natural disaster is search and rescue. Decisions on how to perform all these functions across the entire impacted area must be made at the operational level. In performing these FHA functions, each participating USG agency has some comparative advantages it can employ as well as several specified responsibilities.
USG Roles & Responsibilities. The chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, normally the Ambassador, initiates the USG response to a humanitarian crisis by declaring a disaster. 9 The
Ambassador is responsible for all USG personnel in the country except for U.S. military forces under the combatant command of a Commander in Chief (CINC). 10 The Ambassador integrates these personnel on a Country Team, which also may include members from DOD agencies assigned to the Embassy. 11 The Country Team can be tailored to help coordinate USG efforts during a crisis, and it will normally include a mission disaster response officer (MDRO) from the embassy staff or local USAID Mission. The MDRO serves as a focal point for USG disaster relief efforts in the affected country. 12 The Ambassador and Country Team provide crucial coordination with the host nation, and they are largely responsible for defining the post-crisis end state.
Vital disaster response expertise comes from OFDA, which will dispatch a Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART) to a stricken country. The DART is responsible for coordinating a situation assessment, recommending a USG response, managing USG on-site relief operations, and managing logistics for USG-supplied aid. 13 DART experts quickly identify host nation and HRO resources and capabilities, and they identify gaps the USG might fill. The DART identifies the fastest, most effective way to provide assistance. Often, the best method is to provide funds to the host nation or HROs or to contract supplies and services locally. The DART may also arrange transport of relief supplies stockpiled at OFDA warehouses. As an FHA operation progresses, the DART will monitor the effectiveness of the USG effort and identify organizations to which it can eventually transition USG operations. When relief requirements exceed local capabilities, the DART will recommend the participation of other USG agencies, including DOD. With no directive interagency doctrine, the relationships between the primary USG participants in FHA remain largely undefined. Consequently, relationships must be clarified on an ad hoc basis after a humanitarian crisis has erupted-including the all-important step of clarifying who is in charge of the overall FHA operation. This task is even more difficult in situations in which the U.S. has no embassy, no Ambassador, and no Country Team-as in Somalia-or when a disaster impacts multiple nations as did Hurricane Mitch. Virtually no guidance for organizing interagency operations exists for these situations. These operational-level gaps have had a notable impact on past FHA operations.
FHA Operational Lessons Learned
Each of the FHA operations conducted by the USG since 1991 has achieved some measure of success, but many were hampered by inadequate unity of effort at the operational level. For their part, civilian agencies other than OFDA lack operational doctrine-making their responses "ad hoc, slow, and changeable, and thus difficult for the military to anticipate in its own planning." 29 Assessment is one area in particular that suffers from the lack of interagency doctrine.
Following Hurricane Georges and Hurricane Mitch, CJTFs, U.S. Ambassadors, Country Teams, DARTs, and other USG agencies all generated damage and needs assessments. Different approaches, timing, and methodologies used to develop these assessments led to inconsistent and overlapping data, which "hindered effective planning for the USG's relief and rehabilitation efforts."
Conflicting assessment data made development of an accurate, overall picture of the region-wide situation "a significant challenge." 30 The resulting confusion contributed to serious delays in the USG response.
The lack of interagency doctrine has also fostered inefficiency and wasted effort. After
Hurricane Mitch, individual USG agencies contracted separately for local supplies and services, including water purification units, construction materials, and transportation services. Without coordination between them, they ended up competing with each other and with the local governments and NGOs-inadvertently bidding up prices and rapidly depleting resources. 31 During
Operation Support Hope, 32 which aided refugees fleeing from Rwanda, the military sent water purification units to Lake Kivu without coordinating with the DART or with other humanitarian agencies. These units took too much time to set up and produced too little water. Furthermore, the lake water was of sufficient quality that only pumping-not purification-was needed.
Consequently, "U.S. military efforts actually contributed to a delay in the distribution of water to the various camps."
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If not properly synchronized with civilian USG agencies, military projects can threaten longterm development efforts "if the local population develops higher expectations of what Americans will provide," or if they "create unexpected burdens and costs for NGOs or civilian agencies that try to sustain them." 34 For example, military medical personnel may seek to aid the local population by starting an immunization program, but the host nation and HROs may lack the resources to sustain the program once the military has departed. Both Generals Stackpole and Wehrle were careful to coordinate military efforts with civilian USG experts, and both followed sound advice to restore the situation to pre-disaster standards rather than to make unsustainable improvements.
Preparing for Success
FHA operations are too complex for improvisation, and the costs of "ad hocery" can be high. Following the Hurricane Mitch response, the DOS/USAID review found that "initial delays in deploying sufficient U.S. military assets or launching a large-scale civilian assistance effort likely contributed to the impression that the U.S. was slow to respond." 35 Such an impression may cost the U.S. international influence and prestige, and delays also prolong suffering. Perhaps the most important requirement of interagency doctrine is the need to determine who will be in charge of USG efforts during an FHA operation. Because both the strategic and operational objectives of FHA are mainly political and economic in nature, they are best determined by civilian officials-normally from DOS or USAID. Civilian control of FHA operations should be formalized in interagency doctrine by creating the position of Disaster Response Coordinator (DRC). 45 The U.S. Ambassador or chief of mission could be designated DRC in a single-country disaster, or a President-appointed Special Envoy could be DRC for a multi-country crisis or when the U.S. has no diplomatic mission. Alternatively, the DRC could be a senior disaster response expert supplied by USAID. Interagency doctrine should also provide for supported/supporting agency relationships. DOD and other agencies would most often be supporting agencies for DOS in a humanitarian operation.
Military forces would follow direction provided by the DRC, although they would by law remain under the combatant command of the regional CINC. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) and the DART team leader would be the senior advisors to the DRC from their respective agencies.
The DRC would have the flexibility to organize the operation as needed, but interagency FHA doctrine should provide an organizational template as a common starting point-especially important in rapid-onset emergencies. This template could be for a JIATF, which would be organized by functional area much like a military JTF and a DART. Each element would normally be led by a civilian expert.
A Plans and Assessment Element would be responsible for collecting, analyzing, and tracking data on the disaster. It would include assessment experts from OFDA and the Country Teams as well as military FHA experts-all using common USG assessment standards. Military members could also include intelligence personnel capable of tapping national intelligence and surveillance resources to track refugee movements, identify pockets of trapped populations, and meet other collection requirements. Finally, this element would develop an interagency plan for the FHA operation and update it as necessary.
An Operations Element would be responsible for providing security, which is crucial in a complex emergency. The operations element would also provide oversight to the CMOCs. Finally, the operations element would be responsible for organizing search and rescue activities, and it would manage all health and medical services. 46 The Logistics Element would help establish a logistics system that orders, receives, distributes, and tracks relief supplies provided by the USG. It would also identify required infrastructure repairs. The element could use local contractors after ensuring they are not competing with other relief agencies and after Country Team members determine the policy impact of their use. 47 Other JIATF elements could be formed by the DRC as needed for communications, administration, or other functions. Figure 1 illustrates how a JIATF-FHA template might appear in interagency doctrine. The establishment of a standing JIATF for FHA would be a relatively costly step requiring additional resource commitments from several agencies. While the military would incur the cost of contributing the JIATF's uniformed contingent, the greatest burden would be borne by DOS and USAID-agencies with only a fraction of DOD's resources. The JIATF would require the civilian agencies to develop a ready reserve of personnel who can be quickly deployed to overseas posts during humanitarian crises. With the exception of OFDA, civilian agencies lack sufficient deployability at present. 48 Major bureaucratic hurdles would also need to be overcome. However, a standing JIATF offers an ideal for how USG agencies might attain unity of effort in the future given the requisite commitment of resources and political will. The military should develop this concept further with its interagency partners and support the appropriation of the necessary resources by
Congress.
Conclusion
The U.S. has real interests at stake in FHA, and the USG can no longer afford to treat the organization of FHA operations like a "pick-up" game. FHA has unique characteristics at the operational level, and recent history indicates that more attention must be focused on how the U.S.
Ambassador, Country Team, DART, and JTF organize FHA operations. Pre-designating and training CJTFs and JTF staffs for FHA is a relatively simple and inexpensive step that the military can and should implement unilaterally. Establishing interagency doctrine for FHA would remain inexpensive but would be much more difficult. A standing JIATF would be the most costly and difficult proposal by far, but it offers a model for how the USG might best attain unity of effort in future FHA operations. These proposals form building blocks for better preparing the U.S. military and its interagency partners for FHA. Better preparation before a crisis will promote greater unity of effort during the response and will save time when days or hours can make a difference in the outcome. 
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